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BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN
MEXICO: THE ECHEVERRIA CHALLENGE TO
THE EXISTING DEVELOPMENT MODEL
by Edward C. Epstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
The business community in Mexico, both domestic and foreign,
shared a negative view of the government of President Luis Echeverria
(1970O1976).1 The purpose of this essay is to offer an explantion of this
departure from the normally excellent relations between business and a
Mexican Chief of State. In great part, the answer provided here relates to
Echeverria's desire to modify the earlier pattern of economic growth
(commonly referred to in Mexico. as "desarrollo estabilizador" or "stabi-
lized development") which had lasted at least 15 years and had been ac-
companied by sustained high rates of Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.),
industrial expansion, low inflation and overt political quiescence.2 The
new government's analysts saw this prevailing model of growth as likely
to exhaust itself unless certain changes were made to prevent particular
economic weaknesses from getting out of control. In addition, these advi-
sors were increasingly sensitive to the then existing social costs of Mex-
ico's unevenly distributed prosperity. While the government's policy in-
novations in themselves might have antagonized business, the policy
makers' heavy use of populist rhetoric and attempts to assume a more
nationalist foreign policy virtually assured that the alliance of Mexican
domestic and foreign business groups would view Echeverria with alarm.
Their perception of the government deteriorated further during the grow-
ing economic crisis which culminated in the forced major devaluation of
the peso in August and October of 1976.3
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Utah. B.A., Cor-
nell University (1965); M.A. University of California, Berkeley (1966); Ph.D. University of
nlinois, Champaign-Urbana (1970).
1 See Riding, Mexican Business in Political Move, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 6, col.
1; Marganthaler, Mexican Policies Stir Investor Concern, Wall St. J., July 30, 1973, at 6,
col. 3; Mexican Magnates, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
2 See R. HANSEN, THE POLITIcs OF MEXIcAN DEVELOPMENT 55-58 (1971); C. REYNOLDS,
THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 298-310 (1970); L. SOLIS, LA REALIDAD ECON6MICA MEXICANA (1970).
' For a discussion of the events of 1976, see Ayala, et al., La Crisis Actual, in Mexico,
Hoy 48-94 (4th ed. P. Gonzflez Casanova & E. Florescano eds. 1980); Clement & Green, The
Political Economy of Devaluation in Mexico, 32 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 47-55 (1978); C.
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The business community had been accustomed to economic prosper-
ity. Prior to 1970, its members had been among the principal beneficiaries
of an extended period of economic expansion based on import substitu-
tion industrialization. While in the ensuing division of responsibility be-
tween private and public sectors, business provided imported technology,
large amounts of investment capital and competent management for the
increasingly sophisticated industrial complex, the State offered even
more. Business' successful operation rested in great part on subsidized
power and raw materials from government-run public utilities and basic
industries including a national transportation grid, high tariff protection
and an overvalued peso promoting cheap imports of parts, large amounts
of foreign credit raised by .the government-controlled Nacional Financi-
era, extremely favorable taxes including significant incentives for speci-
fied types of investment, and a docile government-dominated labor move-
ment whose members usually were willing to work for very low wages.
This business-State relationship resulted in the creation of an ever more
industrialized society where in the 30-year period beginning in 1940, the
economy increased at an average rate of 6.5 percent per year, industrial
production at an average rate of 8 percent per year, and where between
1954 and 1970 inflation (as measured by wholesale prices) averaged only
4.4 percent per year.4 High unemployment and inequitable income distri-
bution, both of which were on the increase in the 1960's, did not bother
business; on the contrary, its members clearly benefitted from both phe-
nomena in the form of cheap labor and increasing disposable personal
income.
The mutual acceptance by the Mexican State and the business com-
munity of the pattern of economic growth just described had served as
the basis for an informal coalition between the two. Although the busi-
ness sector included groups like banking, commercialized agriculture,
principal wholesalers, and retailers, manufacturing had long been the fo-
cal point in the maintenance of economic growth and, hence, the most
politically important.5 Within both manufacturing and commerce, the
growing amount of strategically placed foreign investment, controlled
mostly by U.S.-based multinational corporations, had also been of real
political weight.6 Other sectors like the peasantry, organized labor, and
TELLO, LA POLITICA ECON6MICA EN MPxCO, 1970-1976, at 146-82 (4th ed. 1980).
" For G.N.P. and industrial growth figures, see Villarreal, Import-Substituting Indus-
trialization, in AUTHORTARIANISM iN MEXIco 75 (J. Reyna & R. Weinert eds. 1977); for in-
flation figures, see Clement & Green, supra note 3, at 50.
J . CECERA, EL CAPIrrAL MONOPOLISTA Y LA ECONOMIA DE MtXICO (1963); Cinta, Burgue-
sia Nacional y Desarrollo, in 3 EL PERMIL DE M xiCO EN 1980, at 165-99 (J. Martinez Rius,
et al., eds. 1972); Labastida, Los Grupos Dominantes Frente a las Alternativas de Cambio,
in 3 EL PERFIL DE MAxICo EN 1980, at 99-164 (J. Martinez Rius, et al. eds. 1972).
1 F. FAJNZYLBER & N. MARTINEZ TARRAGO, LAS EMPRESAS TRANSNACIONALES (1976).
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the middle classes were subordinated to this dominant business-State co-
alition. Yet despite their formal representation in the ruling political
party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (P.R.I.),7 these three
lower status groups had little impact on national decision-making.
As long as the development model stayed intact and the distribution
of economic and political resources remained unchallenged, the existing
coalition could continue as before. Attempts at the beginning of the
Echeverria presidency to introduce changes were at the heart of the ensu-
ing intra-elite cleavage. Until then, the occasional dispute arising within
the coalition was easily contained through the use of traditional methods
of mutual negotiation by the affected parties.8 The presumption of most
observers was that in the case of disagreement, the State, represented by
the incumbent President, always would prevail over its less cohesive ri-
vals.9 The Echeverria-business conflict of the 1970's may cause this as-
sumption to be reevaluated, for the President was unable to silence his
critics whose protests grew progressively louder as his term continued. 10
Moreover, the fundamental nature of the quarrel over the course of eco-
nomic development in Mexico produced a degree of unity in the business
community that made the usual playing off of one opponent against an-
other very difficult.1
The analysis which follows in the body of this essay on the break-
down of the elite consensus in the course of Mexican development con-
sists of three parts and a postscript. In the first, the reader will find a
Eighty percent of the book value of direct foreign investment in Mexico as of 1970 came
from the United States. See B. SEPemvEDA & A. CHumACERO, LA INVERSI6N EXTRANJERA EN
Mgxco 58 (1973).
7Reyna, Redefining the Authoritarian Regime, in AUTHORITARIANISM IN MExIco, supra
note 4, at 161.
8 Arriola, Los Grupos Empresariales Frente al Estado, 1973-1975, in 16 FoRo INTERNA-
CIONAL 449 (1976). Mr. Arriola sees business' response to Presidents Cirdenas and L6pez
Mateos as similar to that greeting Echeverria. Relations with non-elite groups lacking busi-
ness' strategic place in the economy were of a different order. For one study, see E. STEVENS,
PROTEST AND RESPONSE IN MEXICO (1974).
9 S. PURCELL, THE MExIcAN PRoPrT SHARING DECISION 17-31 (1975); Purcell & Purcell,
Mexican Business and Public Policy, in AuTmorrRTJANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN
AMERICA 201 (J. Malloy ed. 1977); for exceptions to the prevailing view, see Stevens, Mex-
ico's PRI: The Institutionalization of Corporatism?, in AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM
IN LATIN AmECA 234-39 (J. Malloy ed. 1977); Green, Endeudamiento Externo y Debilidad
Estatal: El Caso de M~xico, in 20 FORO INTERNACIONAL 73 (1979).
10 See Arriola, supra note 8, at 449-86.
11 See the formation of the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial on May 7, 1975, as a
coordinating vehicle for such key business groups as CONAMIN (The Industrialists Confed-
eration), CONCANACO (The Confederation of Chambers of Commerce), COPARMEX
(The Employers Confederation), ABM (The Bankers Association), and AMIS (The Insur-
ance Association). Comments about the difficulty of disaggregating redistributional issues
seem particularly relevant here, see Purcell & Purcell, supra note 9, at 212-14.
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description of the serious economic problems observable since the mid-
1960's. Of particular importance here was a deterioration in Mexico's in-
ternational Current Account (the value of all exported goods and services
minus that of all imports) balance and, as compensation, a sharp increase
in foreign indebtedness. The economic problems coincided with the in-
creased visibility of social tension and the corrosion of the regime's politi-
cal legitimacy observable in the 1968 student strike and the "Tlatelolco
massacre."12 As Minister of Government (Gobernaci6n) in the Diaz Ordaz
presidency at the time of Tlatelolco, Echeverria caught much of the criti-
cism for the repression used by that government.
Part two deals with the attempts of Echeverria as President to re-
build the regime's legitimacy while trying to reorder the economy in a
way likely to redress the perceived structural causes of the trade deficit
and related problems. The success of both efforts is debatable.
The third section details business' response. Reacting as if Echever-
ria had intended his economic and political reforms to be a major restruc-
turing of the policies in vogue for decades, business cut its domestic in-
vestment and, as a result of the increases in inflation after the world-wide
energy crisis at the end of 1973, began shifting funds into dollars in what
became a massive flight of capital out of the country.13 The ultimate re-
sult was the 1976 devaluation, a severe crisis of confidence in the Mexican
government and hope that Echeverria's successor as President in Decem-
ber, 1976, Jos6 L6pez Portillo, would reverse the policies found so offen-
sive and revert to the former orthodoxy.
A short postcript takes the analysis up through 1979. The policies of
the post-Echeverria years were, indeed, to prove much more to the liking
of the business community. If the old development model of stabilized
growth had been discredited by Echeverria, his successor's choice to re-
place it contained many of the more conservative biases of the earlier
model.
II. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE DEVELOPMENT MODEL
Upon assuming office at the end of 1970, the Echeverria administra-
tion saw two major sets of reasons, one economic and one political, to
depart from the earlier orthodox pattern of development. Economically,
the years of rapid growth had left behind a legacy of accelerating external
trade deficits and foreign debt. The new industries, while requiring heavy
amounts of costly imported parts and machinery, exported relatively lit-
12 See E. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 185-240.
13 See Arriola, supra note 8, at 485. He suggests that some of the hesitancy to invest
would have occurred given prevailing world economic conditions even if Echeverria had not
made any changes.
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tle to pay for themselves. A related economic concern was the pressure on
international payments caused by profit transfers from the multinational
corporate investors and the royalties paid by all using foreign technology.
Politically, the extremely uneven distribution of benefits from Mexico's
rapid economic growth and the low level of public social services might
generate potentially explosive discontent which could seriously erode the
legitimacy of a regime still claiming to be "revolutionary." The regime's
nationalist credentials were also challenged by the growing influence of
foreign multinationals in key high-profit sectors of industry. To the
Echeverria government, these problem areas required policy action if they
were not to overwhelm the regime at some point in the near future.
The international payments problem clearly existed, and was getting
worse. The overall imbalance in the Current Account had increased from
705 million dollars during the 1953-1958 period to 1,526 million between
1959-1964 and to 3,996 million from 1965 to 1970, better than doubling in
each of the six-year periods roughly corresponding to the presidencies of
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo L6pez Mateos, and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, re-
spectively. Within the total Current Account, the steadily increasing im-
balance in merchandise trade faced a shrinking counterweight in total
services which in the Diaz Ordaz years actually became negative. The de-
terioration in services was almost entirely due to the rapid increase in
payments to foreign capital which rose steadily from 734 million to 1,401
million and 3,091 million dollars in the three six-year intervals under dis-
cussion. Table I provides a detailed breakdown of the Current Account
for the 1953-1970 period.
1980
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TABLE I
Partial Balances of Payments, 1953-1970
(in Millions of Dollars)
Merchandise
Balance
(I)
-208
-132
-23
-228
-420
-407
-262
-428
-317
-242
-279
-445
-431
-420
-615
-710
-654
-955
Service
A
Balance
(II)
+180
+195
+269
+256
+257
+270
+279
+286
+293
+295
+328
+357
+372
+423
+456
+510
+511
+540
Service
B
Balance
(III)
+86
+ 109
+176
+113
+123
+96
+110
+95
+89
+58
+62
+33
-33
+29
+17
-41
-91
-160
Commercial
Balance
(IV)
-28
+63
+246
+28
-163
-137
-17
-142
-24
+53
+49
-88
-59
+3
-159
-200
-143
-410
Balance in
Current
Account
(V)
-122
-23
+153
-115
-297
-311
-152
-333
-228
-184
-217
-412
-398
-391
-598
-751
-743
-1115
(I): Export of Goods - Import of Goods
(II): Export of Services - Import of Services, Without Payments for Rent to Foreign
Capital
(III): (II) + Payments for Rent to Foreign Capital
(IV): (I) + (II)
(V): (I) + (III)
Source: VILLARREAL, supra note 4, at 87.
Examining just net foreign investment (foreign investment minus rental
payments), by 1967-1968, there was a total outflow from Mexico of 334
million dollars. 4 That is, instead of aiding the international payments as
had been true in the 1950's, by the late 1960's foreign investment was a
net drain.
One short-term solution to the increasing payments deficit was to
borrow abroad. The total public foreign debt which in 1961 had stood at
2,114 million dollars was almost to double to 3,775 million by 1970.15 The
"4 Villarreal, supra note 4, at 86.
" INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LATIN AMERICA'S EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS: CUR-
RENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS (1977), Table 37, cited in Green, La Deuda tblica Externa
de Mkxico, 1965-1976, 27 COMERCIO EXTERIOR 1279, 1283 (1977). The debt figures here differ
Year
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servicing of this expanding debt was to require an average of 23.1 percent
of all foreign earnings in the years 1965-1970.1e Clearly, then, increasing
the extent of foreign borrowing was limited in the long term by Mexico's
ability to service any increase on top of large existing obligations.
Preoccupation with the economic costs of continuing the existing de-
velopment model were supplemented by the political concern already
mentioned. In the 1958-1970 period which corresponded to some of the
years of the most rapid economic growth, the distribution of income in
supposedly "revolutionary" Mexico became more and more unequal. Dur-
ing that same period, according to Mexican government surveys, the in-
come share of the poorest 40 percent of the population declined from
14.57 to 11.79 percent while that of the wealthiest 10 percent increased
from 35.70 to 39.21 percent.17 Stated in terms of the Gini index of ine-
quality where zero equals total equality and 1.0 total inequality, Mexico's
figure rose from .450 in 1958 to .496 twelve years later.'8 A more detailed
breakdown of income transfer is available in Table I.
TABLE II
Distribution of Income in Mexico in Deciles, 1958-1970 (%)
Deciles* 1958 1970
I. 2.32 1.42
II. 3.21 2.34
m. 4.06 3.49
IV. 4.98 4.54
V. 6.02 5.46
VI. 7.49 8.24
VII. 8.29 8.24
VHI. 10.73 10.44
IX. 17.20 16.61
X. 35.70 39.21
Total 100.00 100.00
* - Number of Families in Each Decile:
1958: 640,538
1970:889,175
Source: HERNANDEZ LAOS & CORDOVA CHAVEZ, supra note 17, at 507.
from those found in other sources such as C. TELLo, supra note 3, at 141; Weinert, The
State and Foreign Capital, in Aumom2rrRusm iN MExIco, supra note 4, at 123.
10 See Green, supra note 15, at 1284.
17 Hernfndez Laos & Cordova Chtivez, Estructura de la Distribuci6n del Ingreso en
M~xico, 29 COMERCiG EXTERMOR 505, 507 (1979).
Is Id. at 508.
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The poverty of many Mexicans was closely linked to widespread unem-
ployment which Ren6 Villarreal saw as being the equivalent of 26.8 per-
cent of the economically active population in 1970 alone.19
Social expenditures in Mexico were quite low, concentrated in the
major urban areas like the Federal District which includes Mexico City.
As of 1970, social security accounted for only 2.5 percent of G.D.P., while
that for public health and education added on only 0.5 and 2.2 percent,
respectively.2 0 Total government spending in Mexico (including all three
items) as a percent of G.D.P. in 1970 was 13.1, well below the 22.0 for
Chile, 21.4 for Venezuela, 20.0 for Brazil, and only slightly better than the
12.2 of Somoza-run Nicaragua.21 Low social expenditures, in turn, re-
flected a stagnant tax base and government funds going to subsidize ser-
vices to private industry.22
As with the various international payments and foreign debt
problems, those associated with inequitable income distribution, unem-
ployment and inadequate social services presented a medium for long-
range political threat to any Mexican government. Few informed observ-
ers were expecting mass risings of the urban poor or the even more under-
privileged peasantry in the immediate future. What did seem at stake was
the further undermining of the regime's revolutionary legitimacy. As Su-
san Purcell stated, "Most Mexicans ... now one or two generations re-
moved from the event. . seem to be less affected by the symbols of the
Revolution and more cynical regarding the intention of their leaders to
implement the social-justice goals of the Revolution. ' 23 The heavy-
handed repression used to deal with the peaceful student demonstrations
of 1968, which culminated in the events of Tlatelolco in September, only
reinforced those who argued that the revolution had ended effectively
with the conclusion of the Lizaro CArdenas presidency in 1940.24 The
more doubtful the regime's legitimacy, the more likely that it would have
to return to the use of violence to silence those lower status groups of
protestors like the alienated university students and intellectuals who
were publicly questioning the values behind the regime's allocation of
governmental resources.
Foreign investment raised a less visible but equally important threat
,9 Villarreal, supra note 4, at 75-76.
20 C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 37, citing figures from the Secretaria de Hacienda y Cr~d-
ito Pfiblico, Cuenta Piblica de 1970.
"1 C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 36.
22 Id. at 36-38.
22 Purcell, The Future of the Mexican System, in AUTHORITARIANISM IN MFXcO, supra
note 4, at 178.
2' For descriptions of the events of Tlatelolco in addition to those of E. STEVENS, supra
note 8, see E. PONTnATOWSKA, LA NOCHE DE TLATELOLCO (1971); R. RAMIREZ, EL MOVImNTO
ESTUDIANTIL DE Mikxico, JuLio-DIcIEMBRE DE 1968 (1969).
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to the regime's political control.2 5 The multinational corporations invest-
ing heavily in Mexico since the mid-1950's were becoming more impor-
tant in particular branches of industry. Although direct foreign invest-
ment as of 1970 controlled only 27.6 percent of the- value of
manufacturing as a whole, the figure was as high as 79.3 percent for elec-
trical machinery and 84.2 percent for rubber.2 Table III shows the figures
for particular selected types of industry, comparing the percentages of
1962 with those of 1970 so that increases can be noted.
TABLE I
Share of Foreign Enterprise in the Value of Manufacturing Production, 1962-1970 (%)
Branches of Industry 1962 1970
Chemical Products 58.4 67.2
Construction Machinery 44.9 62.0
Electric Machinery 58.3 79.3
Transport Equipment 42.6 49.1
Rubber 76.7 84.2
Non-Metalic Mineral
Products 24.4 26.6
Basic Metals 17.7 25.2
Metal Products 20.6 37.0
All Industry Average 19.6 27.6
Source: SEPULVEDA & CHUMACERO, supra note 6, at 56.
As can be seen, the influence of foreign investment rose from 19.6 to
27.6 percent in the nine-year period, with most of the growth coming at
the expense of Mexican companies which were taken over. Whereas in the
earlier 1948-1957 interval, 61 percent of the subsidiaries of U.S. owned
corporations in Mexico were newly established compared to 39 percent
acquired from already existing Mexican firms, during the 1958-1967 pe-
riod these figures for new versus acquired subsidiaries were exactly re-
versed.2 7 Rather than providing risk-taking initiatives in opening new ar-
eas of industry, U.S. (and other) multinationals increasingly were ousting
national competition, thus leading to greater market concentration.2 s
In his analysis of the role of foreign capital in Mexico, Richard Wei-
nert saw the foreign-linked market concentration and domination of Mex-
ican industry as likely to weaken the political control of the government
as new areas of the economy were subject to directives coming from
21 Weinert, supra note 15, at 110-11.
26 B. SEPOLVEDA & A. CHUMACERO, supra note 6, at 56.
27 J. VAUPEL & J. CuRHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 300-01 (1969).
28 For an examination of the effect of multinationals on market concentration, see F.
FAJNZYLBER & N. MARTINEZ TARRAGO, supra note 6, at 171-99.
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abroad and, presumably, made in the interest of foreign concerns rather
than those of the Mexican government.2 The self-interest of the gov-
erning elite would suggest that appropriate measures be taken to define
more closely the conditions under which new foreign investment would be
welcome in the future. Given the importance with which foreign invest-
ment and technology were viewed by the business community, some
equally salient justification had to be created for measures meant to limit
the potential political influence of the foreign corporation. Such a justifi-
cation was to be found within the tradition of Mexican nationalism.
Thus, at the end of 1970, the incoming Echeverria administration
was convinced of the need to make some significant readjustments in the
existent pattern of economic and political development. The worsening
interhiational payments and foreign debt situation would require new re-
strictions on imports and a concerted effort to promote exports. Some of
these restrictions on imports also would be aimed at meeting particular
nationalist concerns. At the same time, the new administration sought to
deal with social discontent by expanding the distribution of benefits de-
rived from previous economic growth. Such efforts were intended to win
support from previously alienated students and intellectuals as well as
the poor in whose name the former groups'often spoke. The question
raised here is whether the new President could find a viable strategy to
meet these goals without destroying a political coalition in which organ-
ized business had long been paramount. The next section discusses the
attempts made to assemble a program including the mentioned goals; the
following section analyzes the response of business.
III. THE EcHEVERRIA REFORMS
In his inaugural address to the nation, President Echeverria an-
nounced that his government would "strengthen the social and economic
content of its democratic institutions" and, if necessary, "modify the de-
velopment strategy" to achieve this goal.30 The discussion here is an at-
tempt to describe the contents of such a reform program, focusing on
those areas which the new government itself saw as potentially serious
problems. As mentioned earlier, the problems relating to that develop-
ment strategy included the imbalance in international payments and the
resulting escalation of foreign debt, the denationalizaton of key areas of
the economy caused by the expansion of multinational corporations, the
inequitable distribution of national income and underfunding of social
services, and the government's proclivity to suppress all dissent from
lower status groups through the measured use of force and intimidation.
29 Weinert, supra note 15, at 111.
o Arriola, supra note 8, at 450.
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Proposed solutions to these problems constituted the administration's
program. Although associated in terms of general timing, the govern-
ment's use of a nationalist-populist rhetoric should be seen as, at most,
logically derivative rather than an integral part of the reforms themselves.
The government's response to both the balance of payments and de-
nationalization problems was the passage of two controversial pieces of
legislation-the Law on the Registry of Technological Transfer and the
Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks of 1972 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Technology Law")"1 and the Law to Promote Mexican
Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment of 1973 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Foreign Investment Law").3 2 Many critics alleged that
not only were firms operating in Mexico frequently paying excessively for
their largely imported technology (thus hurting Mexico's international
payments), but that the agreements signed for the use of this foreign
technology often contained offensive restrictions on its implementation,
such as the prohibition of subsequent export of goods made with it."3 Ar-
ticle 7 of the new Technology Law listed 14 conditions under which tech-
nology would not normally be registerable with the newly established Na-
tional Registry for the Transference of Technology and, hence where the
contracts for the use of the imported technology would not be legally
binding.4 Parts of the same Article which are particularly relevant here
included bans under the following conditions:
(1) When the object is the transference of technology freely available in
the country... ;
(2) When the price has no relation to [the value of] the technology ac-
quired or constitutes an unjustifiable and excessive burden on the na-
tional economy;
(4) When the obligation is established to cede for little or nothing to
'l Law for the Registration of Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of
Patents and Trademarks, [1972] Diario Oficial [D.O.], Dec. 30, 1972 (Mex.) [hereinafter
cited as Technology Law]. For discussion of this and the new Law on Inventions and Trade
Marks, [1976] D.O., Feb. 10, 1976 (Mex.), see Rangel Medina, Significant Innovations of the
New Mexican Law on Inventions and Trade Marks, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 5 (1977).
82 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment, [1973]
D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 (Mex.) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Investment Law], for a discussion of
this law, see Arrioja Vizcaino, The Law on Foreign Investment, 7 GA. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L.
33 (1977). For an earlier discussion of these two laws, see Epstein, Introduction to Recent
Developments in Mexican Law: Politics of Modern Nationalism, 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1 (1974).
3 M. WIONCZEK, INVEMION Y TEcNOLOGIA EXTRANJERA EN AMRIcA LATINA 163 (1971),
citing a 1969 study of U.S. subsidiaries operating in Mexico by the National Chamber Foun-
dation of Washington, D.C., in which almost half of those subsidiaries responding admitted
that export prohibitions had been imposed upon them by their home offices.
84 Foreign Investment Law, Art. 7, [1973] D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 (Mex.).
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the purveyor of the technology the patents, trademarks, innovations, or
improvements that are obtained by the acquirer;
(7) When the export of the goods or services produced by the acquirer
are prohibited in a manner contrary to the interest of the country .... 35
During the Registry's first 15 months, it rejected some 35 percent of tech-
nology agreements submitted to it.3 6
The Foreign Investment Law, in turn, codified a number of already
existing restrictions on both the extent of and areas for such investment
to be permitted. Except for those areas like petroleum, basic petrochemi-
cals, electric energy, railroads, and telegraph where the State was to
maintain a total monopoly,3 7 or those such as radio and television, inter-
urban transportation, gas distribution and forestry exploitation where
only Mexican citizens could participate,38 foreign investment was limited
to no more than 49 percent of the capital of any concern.3 9 Other excep-
tions included banking and insurance where the limit was 25 percent,
mineral reserves with 34 percent, and the secondary use of petrochemicals
and the production of automobile parts, both with 40 percent.40 New to
the Foreign Investment Law was the provision in Article 8 which gave
legal preference to Mexican investors in the purchase of any firm for sale
and which required special authorization from the National Commission
for Foreign Investment whenever foreigners acquired more than 25 per-
cent of the capital or 49 percent of the fixed assets, and that in Article 13
which specified a list of 17 guidelines including the effect of foreign in-
vestment on the balance of payments and on Mexico's ability to export
for granting an exception to the general 49 percent maximum rule.41 Alan
Riding stated that in the 1973-1974 period, the 49 percent rule was
waived in 74 of 103 requests.42
The encouragement of exports and the limits on unnecessary or ex-
cessively costly imports of technology were intended to improve the defi-
cit in international payments. The hope was that if the deficit could be
reduced, Mexico would have less cause to increase its large official foreign
debt. The 49 percent rule was meant to maintain Mexican control of the
31 Epstein, supra note 32, at 6-7. Exceptions to some of these 14 conditions including
number 2 can be made where the technology to be acquired is "of particular interest to the
country." Id. at 6.
316 Weinert, supra note 15, at 122.
37 Foreign Investment Law, art. 4, [1973] D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 (Mex.).
- Id. arts. 4, 5.
" Epstein, supra note 32, at 7.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 8.
42 Riding, Mexico Again Seeks Foreign Investment, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1974, at 65,
col. 1.
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national economy or at least to force foreign investment into those areas
where it would be the most helpful rather than those most likely to be the
most profitable.
Attempts to maintain the effective standard of living for the poorest
Mexicans took several forms: increases in the minimum wage, more
money for social services, price controls on certain items of popular con-
sumption, more subsidized public housing, and more credit for small agri-
culture including the village-owned ejidos.
With respect to the urban minimum wage, the government made a
concerted effort to make periodic upward adjustments in order to control
inflation. The data presented in Table IV suggests that the real minimum
wage (the nominal wage deflated by the amount of inflation) never
dropped below 83.5 percent of its January, 1972 value, with a figure in the
lower 90th percentile more typical as the bottom prior to an increase.
TABLE IV
Urban Real Minimum Wage (Constant 1972 Pesos)
Index, 1972-1976
Date: 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Jan. Sept. Oct. Dec. Jab. Sept. Oct. Dec. Jan. Aug. Dec.
Index: 100.0 83.5 97.5 92.5 103.5 93.9 112.4 97.5 105.9 99.3 104.4
Source: TELLO, supra note 3, 72, 144, 158.
Similar attempts were made by the government to encourage salary in-
creases for those receiving more than the minimum wage. 4 3
Throughout the Echeverria administration, a strong emphasis was
made to increase public spending in the social sector, that is, for educa-
tion, public health and social security. According to the official data for
real spending (nominal amounts deflated by the amount of inflation)-in
Table V-and that for relative spending as a percent of the Mexican Fed-
eral Budget-in Table VI-the funding for education increased some
117.8 percent in constant pesos, a relative increase of 1.0 percent of the
Budget in the 1971-1976 period, while that of public health and social
security combined grew some 67.7 percent in constant pesos, a relative
13 Arriola, supra note 8, at 465.
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decrease of 1.8 percent of the Budget in the same six-year span.
TABLE V
Change in Social Spending Index (Constant 1970 Pesos)
Year: 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 A1971-1976
Education
Health &
Social Security
Education
Health &
Social Security
100.0 117.8 135.6 150.0 191.1 217.8 +117.8%
100.0 111.8 118.6 144.1 135.4 167.7 +67.7%
Source: TELLO, supra note 3, 55, 131.
TABLE VI
Relative Change in Social Spending (as % of Budget)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 A 1971-1976
7.8 7.9 7.4 7.5 7.8 8.8 +1.0
13.9 13.3 11.6 12.9 9.9 12.1 -1.8
Source: TELLO, supra note 3, 54, 131.
The attempts to give poorer Mexicans more consumption power were
varied. FONACOT (the National Fund for the Development and Guaran-
tee of Consumption) was established to subsidize the purchase of con-
sumer durables; at the same time, more funds were given to the already
established CONASUPO (the National Company for Popular Subsis-
tence) for providing cheap staples to the public. Another agency, IN-
FONAVIT (the Institute of the National Fund for Workers Housing) was
created to construct more subsidized public housing.44 Other government
money was channeled to the rural sector in the form of specialized credit
and infrastructural spending.45
The government sought to pay for its greatly expanded social pro-
gram through tax reform and higher charges on public utilities and State-
provided basic industrial commodities. The new taxes introduced were
mostly indirect ones on items like bottled water and tobacco or business
taxes also paid eventually by the consumer. All attempts to reform the
low income tax in a more progressive direction were abandoned in the
face of widespread business hostility and threats to invest abroad.46 Al-
though charges ultimately were raised on government-provided electric-
4 C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 52, 64-65, 110; Arriola, supra note 8, at 458; Pereyra,
Estado y Sociedad, in Mxico, Hoy supra note 3, at 299.
45 Purcell, supra note 23, at 177; C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 75.
11 C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 52, 61, 116.
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ity, water, fuels, telephones, railroad service, steel, and fertilizers, the in-
creases usually were well below the general inflation rate; such goods and
services continued to be subsidized for all users, rich and poor. As with
income tax increases, business strongly opposed any decrease in what
amounted to subsidies from the government. Due to this resistence to
higher charges, most State-run enterprises ran at a significant loss. 47
The final area of the reform program dealt with greater democratiza-
tion. Despite the formal trappings of a democracy, a number of observers
agreed with Susan Purcell's characterization of Mexican politics as "au-
thoritarian.14 As President, Echeverria experimented with what he called
a "democratic opening" ("apertura democritica"). Early in his adminis-
tration, those still jailed from the student demonstrations of 1968 were
released.4 9 In May, 1971, Echeverria supported protesting university stu-
dents at the University of Nuevo Le6n in Monterrey, resulting in the dis-
missal of the conservative Rector and the state Governor who had ap-
pointed him.50 Efforts were also made to decontrol trade union elections.
When various union groups responded to their membership with agitation
for higher wages, such strikes were officially tolerated rather than simply
declared illegal and suppressed as had been common prior to 1970.51 Such
toleration was not without its limits, however; certain actions like the
ouster of the director of the independent newspaper Excelsior in July,
1976, demonstrated the sensitivity of the government to criticism at a
time when many of its policies were under attack.5 2 In the same way, the
intensifying economic crisis of 1975-1976 caused the administration to
reassert its control over labor and to abandon its plans to get rid of the
long entrenched, unrepresentative leaders of the national Mexican Work-
ers Confederation (C.T.M.).5 3
As suggested earlier, the various Echeverria reforms discussed were
all intended, directly or indirectly, to be possible solutions to the
problems diagnosed as byproducts of the economic development model.
One aspect of the government's activities, the often strident use of na-
tionalist-populist rhetoric and gestures, is not so easily explained. From
47 Id. 73, 158.
" Anderson & Cockcroft, Control and Cooptation in Mexican Politics, 7 INT'L J. OF
CoMp. Soc. 11, 19-28 (1966); R. HANSEN, supra note 2; K. JOHNSON, MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A
CRMCAL VIEW (1971); Purcell, Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime, 26 WORLD
POL. 28 (1973); Stevens, Protest Movements in an Authoritarian Regime: The Mexican
Case, 7 CoMP. POL. 361 (1975).
4" C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 44.
:0 Epstein, supra note 32, at 11.
I C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 102-04.
52 Fernandez Christlieb, El Derecho a la Informacibn y los Medios de Difusibn Masiva,
in MExICo, Hoy, supra note 3, at 343; Pereyra, supra note 44, at 298.
53 Pereyra, supra note 44, at 301-02.
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the policy viewpoint, how does one explain actions like the warm official
welcome given to visiting Marxist President Salvador Allende of Chile in
late 1972 and the public mourning in September, 1973, with the coup that
ended Chilean democracy; the loudly announced formation of a govern-
ment-worker Popular Alliance from which all businessmen were excluded;
and Mexico's "solidarity" with a variety of Third World causes seemingly
far removed from the realities of Mexican domestic concerns?5" A tenta-
tive answer links these actions not to the reform program itself but to the
particular strategy chosen to implement those reforms. The rhetoric and
gestures can be interpreted as part of a strategy intended to win support
for the government from previously alienated groups of radical students
and intellectuals. In the face of the hostile reaction of the conservative
business community and as an attempt to preserve the prestige of the
administration while under attack, government leaders took the offensive,
trying to mobilize support from the workers and publicly questioning the
nationalist credentials of business organizations. The point is that while
such a response by the government encouraged further business hostility,
the nationalist-populist posturing was at most only derivative of the
Echeverria reforms rather than an integral part of them.
Taken as a whole, the reforms were intended to restore spent social
and economic capital not renewed in some cases since the Cirdenas presi-
dency of the 1930's. By 1970, the legitimacy of the revolutionary regime
seemed greatly tarnished; in the same sense, many important State enter-
prises were badly underfunded while the chronic imbalance of payments
demanded action. That Echeverria did not solve all of Mexico's problems
is not surprising, especially in view of the unforeseen world-wide energy
crisis that greatly complicated economic management after 1973. Much of
the criticism launched at the President had its roots less in the growing
economic problems than in the challenge his reforms presented to those
who represented the economic and social status quo and benefitted from
the system as it was. A discussion of their response to the Echeverria
challenge is found next.
IV. CONFRONTATION POLITICS
The assumption that those controlling the Mexican State would al-
ways win in a confrontation with any pressure group was called into ques-
tion by the events of the Echeverria presidency. In the conflict between a
largely unified business community and the State, the results were, at
best, a standoff. Obviously, business was not an ordinary pressure group,
but one which-with the State itself-constituted the major force in re-
cent Mexican politics. The particular nature of the conflict focusing on
54 C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 59-60, 70; Arriola, supra note 8, at 461-64.
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the future of the existing development model unified most business
groups. The new government, on the other hand, was not totally united.
In addition, the unexpected post-1973 economic events were to make the
government especially vulnerable to a major challenge from the business
sector.
Business has had a number of potential weapons for use in any con-
flict with the State, ranging from domestic rumor-mongering and interna-
tional criticism to a refusal to invest in the economy, short-term suspen-
sions of productive activities through owners strikes and, ultimately, a
policy of capital flight leading to monetary devaluation. In the 1971-1976
period, all of these tactics saw some use by a business community antago-
nized by the Echeverria reforms and frightened by the administration's
rhetoric.
The Echeverria-dominated State was extremely hesitant to use all
the means at its disposal against a group as critical to continued economic
growth as the business community. This hesitancy was probably due to a
fear of the consequences of alienating all of business against the govern-
ment and an unwillingness to risk a conflict of such magnitude as to
threaten the collapse of the growth model. Again, the Echeverria adminis-
tration has been seen here as reformist, not revolutionary. Radical-sound-
ing rhetoric was far removed from a conscious strategy intended to pro-
mote total confrontation, open violence, or civil war with the possibility
of a pro-business military coup. Ironically, the confrontation which did
result went much further than the government could have anticipated.
Virtually any effort made by Echeverria to intervene in the economy
aroused opposition from business. Where those actions were in any sense
likely to redistribute income more equitably, business criticism intensi-
fied. Faced with the tax reform law introduced in December, 1970, the
head of the Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic
(COPARMEX) complained of a lack of prior consultation, as had been
the custom in previous administrations. 5 All future tax measures were
similarly opposed. The legislation intended to restrict the imports of
technology and the scope of foreign investment was equally offensive,
provoking the intervention of the U.S. Ambassador in an October, 1973
speech to the U.S.-Mexican Businessmen's Committee where he stated
his "preoccupation" with such laws.56 The March, 1973 attempts to ex-
tend price controls and to promote the distribution of subsidized goods
were criticized by the heads of the Confederation of Chambers of Com-
"C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 44-46.
Id. at 57-59. The Ambassador's comments are reprinted in McBride, Are the Rules
of the Game Being Changed?, 18 COMMERCIo EXTERIOR 5, 5-7 (1972) (English language
version).
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merce (CONCONACO) as themselves being inflationary." Business' stan-
dard answer to inflation was less government spending on the new social
programs.5"
The effort by the government at increased democratization met open
hostility from organized business. The administration was accused of con-
tributing to the wave of physical attacks, kidnappings and murders by its
policies of toleration of domestic leftist groups and its friendliness to the
Marxist Allende regime in Chile. The murder of Monterrey industrialist
Eugenio Garza Sada less than a week after Echeverria had declared three
days of national mourning for the overthrow of Allende led to a series of
particularly bitter condemnations of the Mexican government by busi-
ness. '9 In the same sense, the independent trade union groups, many of
which were coordinated by the Authentic Labor Front (F.A.T.), were ac-
cused by the Employers Confederation of Marxist-Leninist and Anarcho-
Sindicalist leanings. The Vice-President of the Industrialists Confedera-
tion (CONCAMIN) called for-the imprisonment of those "leaders and ag-
itators.., who only cause hate, agitation and demagoguery."60
A series of business-inspired rumor campaigns spread by the mass
media were intended to cast doubt on the government's control of events.
Here the public was informed of a series of supposed rapes and killings of
young women in Mexico City (end 1972), a shortage of food supplies
(1972), a shortage of gasoline (1973), vaccines supposedly sterilizing wo-
men (end 1974), free government textbooks promoting Marxist, atheist,
and anti-Mexican values (1975), an urban planning law which might
somehow eliminate private property (1975), and a coup d'6tat expected to
overthrow Echeverria or, in another version, to install him as dictator
(1976).61
At the same time as the various efforts to discredit the government,
business investment in the economy was spotty. As shown in Table VII,
private investment fell in 1972 and again in 1975, while barely increasing
at all in 1976.
5 C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 67; Arriola, supra note 8, at 458-59.
C. TELLO, supra note 3, at 67; Arriola, supra note 8, at 460.
' Arriola, supra note 8, at 461-63; Monsivdis, La Ofensiva IdeolOgica de la Derecha, in
MikxIco, H6Y, supra note 3, at 313.
"' Arriola, supra note 8, at 467.
6 Monsivais, supra note 59, at 315-21; Pereyra, supra note 44, at 300; C. TELLO, supra
note 3, at 134, 164-66.
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TABLE VII
Increase in Private Investment, 1971-1976 (%)
1971 1972 1973. 1974 1975 1976
6.4 -1.0 4.7 13.8 -1.9 0.9
Source: TELLO, supra note 3, 74, 136.
The slowdowns in private investment at the end of Echeverria's term co-
incided with a number of regional owners strikes or lockouts intended to
show business displeasure with the government.2
The most serious sign of business' growing lack of confidence in the
government's handling of the national economy was a hesitance of inves-
tors to put their money into peso bank accounts and a corresponding shift
to dollar ones which became massive in scope as the plan to devalue the
peso on August 31, 1976 became increasingly obvious despite government
denials. Table VIH provides statistics on the flight from the peso to the
dollar.
TABLE VIH
The Shift to Dollars
1975:
January
August
September
October
November
1976:
January
August
September
October
November
Peso Accounts
(Billions of
Pesos)
145.5
173.4
174.7
179.5
181.7
186.5
193.5
182.9
175.3
160.2
Dollar Accounts
(Millions of
Dollars)
508.6
641.9
656.2
675.2
700.3
828.2
1681.4
1574.4
1798.7
1911.3
Source: TELLO, supra note 3, 160-161.
With the devaluations of August and October, 1976, capital flight out of
Mexico which was noticeable a year earlier became massive. Taking shifts
in short-term capital and those listed in the balance of payments as "er-
rors and omissions" as evidence of this outpouring of money to the
United States, capital flight in 1976 may have been in the area of 2.7
42 C. TtuLo, supra note 3, at 124-25; Arriola, supra note 8, at 466.
Year.
% Increase
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billion dollars. Figures for capital flight out of Mexico are found in Table
IX.
TABLE IX
Capital Flight from Mexico
(in Millions of Dollars)*
Year: 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Short-Term
Capital -24 +92 -308 +242 +763 -426
Shift
"Errors & +234 +196 +46 -381 -1172 -2341
Omissions"
Total +210 +256 -262 -139 -409 -2767
* A positive sign before figure indicates an increase of capital; a negative sign indicates
capital flight.
Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, 30 Int'l Financial Statistics 250 (1978).
During Echeverria's last few months in office, many Mexicans viewed his
administration as largely a failure.
V. POSTSCRIPT: THE LOPEZ PORTILLO ADMINISTRATION
In retrospect, our appraisal of the Echeverria regime may turn out to
be more positive than it was initially. While his efforts to control both the
deficit in current accounts and the growing foreign debt were clearly inad-
equate, much of this failure was due to the unforeseen world energy crisis.
The same can be said for the inflation in Mexico. That country certainly
was not alone among the lesser developed nations in having economic
problems after 1973. On the more positive side, the investments made in
petroleum exploration were to be highly successful, but only after
Echeverria's term was over. In a similar sense, the efforts made in the
1970-1976 interval to repair the regime's worn legitimacy with the Mexi-
can poor may have made the Lpez Portillo conservative policies politi-
cally possible.
In the crisis atmosphere which pervaded Mexico in December 1976,
the new President introduced a set of essentially conservative economic
policies. One can speculate that President L6pez Portillo supported these
initiatives not only for their intrinsic merits as policy, but also because
they were likely to guarantee the incoming administration the imprimatur
of both the domestic investors alienated by Echeverria and of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund to which that beseiged President had been
forced to turn for needed foreign exchange. With the massive capital
Vol. 12:525
BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
flight provoked by the devaluations of the peso, Mexico badly needed ad-
ditional financing. Although the extent of the country's newly discovered
oil wealth was just beginning to be known by the end of 1976, its full
exploitation would take a number of years and large amounts of borrowed
cash. Given the perceived need for continued financing from both domes-
tic and foreign non-governmental sources, any President inheriting power
as L6pez Portillo had, faced the question not of whether to adopt a con-
servative economic plan but, rather, what sort of conservative plan.63
The L6pez Portillo economic recovery program was labeled the "Alli-
ance for Production."" After promising total respect for private initiative
and the continuation of free monetary convertibility, the government out-
lined a series of eight investment priorities of which agriculture and en-
ergy were paramount.6 5 In addition to the hoped-for renewal of private
investment, the administration sought to increase its own access to do-
mestic funds through both mild tax reform and the creation of a Workers
Investment Bank. 6 The new President sought to deal with the continued
imbalance in merchandise trade largely as had been done in the recent
past, that is, by further progress in import substitution and a revived em-
phasis on non-traditional exports. 67 Perhaps the most widely heralded as-
pect of the new plan was its creation of a rationalized administrative
structure for the bureaucracy combined with strict control against budg-
etary overrun by government agencies. s
Compared to the threatening reforms of the Echeverria years, the
L6pez Portillo program must have appeared quite safe to business. Calls
for efficiency, limits on government spending, and more private invest-
ment seem the hallmark of any conservative administration. As is obvious
from the following quotation, here was a President who (although he as-
sumed general responsibility for the economy as a whole) sought to reas-
sure those with funds to invest that they once again were wanted as the
government's partner:
We have offered the conditions so that private initiative... has the
means to decide where to invest to join in the collective job of national
63 For a general description of the early years of the L6pez Portillo economic program,
see Del Vilar, El Manejo y la Recuperaci6n de la Economia Mexicqna en Crisis 1976-1978,
in 19 FoRo INTERNAcioNAL 540, 552-70 (1979). The description of that program as "conserva-
tive," is mine, not his.
" L6pez Portillo, Primer Informe Presidencial, in 27 COMERCIo EXTERIOR 1098, 1116
(1977).
65 L6pez Portillo, Aspectos Econ6micos del Discurso de Toma de Posesi6n del Pre-
sidente de M~xico, in 26 COMmRCIO ExTmOR 1459, 1461 (1976).
66 Id. at 1462.
67 Id; Bennett & Sharpe, La Ind6stria Automotriz y la Politica de Promoci6n de Ex-
portacionesi in 46 Er. TmuasTRE EcoNS6co 730 (1979).
"' L6pez Portillo, supra note 65, at 1463-64.
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reconstruction and the renewal of progress. Those of higher income
ought to contribute without fear or inhibitions; this is how in reality they
will guarantee their profits. We are not opposed to their gain as long as
the country always benefits at the same time .... 19
The L6pez Portillo policies seem to have had more in common with
those of the pro-business Diaz Ordaz government (1964-1970) than those
of Echeverria. A serious attempt was made to limit non-priority spending.
In contrast to the rapid expansion of spending under Echeverria, that for
government services in 1977 grew in real terms at a rate 45 percent below
that of the G.D.P. 70 The rate of new official foreign borrowing which had
reached epidemic proportions in the 1973-1976 period, was confined to
the three billion dollar annual ceiling agreed to with the I.M.F. in both
1977 and 1978, despite the vastly larger borrowing capacity brought about
by Mexico's new oil wealth. 7' As a means of ensuring business profits, the
administration forced workers to accept wages below the rate of inflation.
In 1977, for example, of the 5,031 strike petitions brought before the
Mexican Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board by the unions, 3,596
were either declared by the government to lack legal standing or were
withdrawn without any formal hearing. The figure for invalidated or
withdrawn petitions in 1976 under Echeverria had been only 355.72 Ac-
cording to one source, real wages in Mexico, in the face of continuing
inflation, fell 14.80 and 2.85 percent for 1977 and 1978, respectively." The
calls for tax revision-originally for greater progressivity-led to the same
conservative results due to business' strong opposition; the tax structure
emerging was to rely even more than before on indirect taxes including a
new Value Added Tax.74 Finally, in the name of greater productivity, ma-
jor changes seem in store for agriculture, an area of chronically declining
yields in recent years. A new law, in effect, does away with the old limits
on large land concentration if such estates are used part time for cattle
raising. In the future, village-owned ejido lands may be rented openly to
large landowners in what is to be called "association contracts," a practice
forbidden in the past in order to protect the integrity of independent
peasant agriculture. Such large producers will be guaranteed priority ac-
cess to credits, fertilizers, and other inputs on the presumption that they,
not the ejidos, are most likely to add to the commercialized sector of agri-
" L6pez Portillo, supra note 65, at 1116.
70 Del Villar, supra note 64, at 565.
71 Green, Cambios Recientes en la Politica de Deuda Externa de Gobierno Mexicano
in 19 FORO INTERNACIONAL 453 (1979).
72 Del Villar, supra note 64, at 567.
Ortiz Mena, Accibn Sindical, Salarios e Inflacibn in 47 EL TrIMESTRE EcoN6mico
474 (1980).
' Del Villar, supra note 64, at 567-68.
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culture. Government officials have spoken of bringing the land redistribu-
tion stage of Mexico's agrarian reform to final resolution by 1980, regard-
less of peasant land needs.7 5
After some initial hesitation, the business community appears to
have responded to the L6pez Portillo incentives. As G.D.P. expanded
strongly in 1978 and 1979, putting an end to the 1976-1977 recession,76
private investment increased to new record figures. Table X compares
U.S. private investment-seen as a surrogate for all domestic and foreign
private investment-for 1975 and 1976, the last two Echeverria years,
with that for 1977 and 1978, the first two of L6pez Poftillo.
TABLE X
U.S. Direct Investment in Mexico
(in millions of dollars)
Echeverria L6pez Portillo
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978
Sum 3,177 2,984 3,175 3,712
Source: U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 56-59 SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUSINESS *(1976-1979) at 49, 45, 28, 27,
respectively.
Figures for 1979 surpassed those of 1977-1978, while investment in 1980
is predicted to be yet another record.7 7 Clearly, the response of organized
business to the L6pez Portillo presidency has been highly favorable.78
In summary, the L6pez Portillo government seems to have achieved
its goal of reconciliation with the business community in Mexico, and,
therewith, the restoration of rapid economic growth. The discovery of and
the publicity given to Mexico's new oil wealth have facilitated this pro-
cess greatly. Thus a conservative economic policy has resurrected the his-
toric alliance of government and business. While such a policy seems a
major return to the situation as it was before the Echeverria years, such
an about-face, ironically, has been facilitated politically by the efforts of
Echeverria to restore some of the regime's faded legitimacy with the less
well-off.
7 Agriculture: New Mexican Policy Opens Door to Agro-Industry, in 7 LATiN AMERI-
CAN ECONoMic REPORT 156-57 (1979).
76 Banco de M6xico, Informe sobre la Evoluci6n de la Economia Mexicana Durante
1979, in 30 CoMERcio EXTERIOR 251, 253 (1980).
7 See El Pais Crece en Cifras, Pero Tambi~n en Injusticias, PRocaso, Mar. 10, 1980 at
14; Informe de Bancomer, PRoCFso, id. at 15.
78 See Prospects for Profits, Bus. Int'l, Mar. 16, 1979, at 85; Holt, Why the Bankers
Suddenly Love Mexico, FORTUNE, July 16, 1979, at 138-40, 142, 145.
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